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From time to time conditions change in every community. The necessity of
to-day becomes useless to-morrow. A new generation has needs its predeces-
sors never imagined.... A changed situation may make the taking of par-
ticular property necessary to the public good .... 122
Chief Justice Schaefer's own philosophy can be found in a speech
given in December 1959. He stated:
For my part, I am quite willing to forget those "generations yet unborn."
In fact, I would like to. But I do think that a conscious look ahead is impor-
tant. The pressure of the facts in the case at hand is always very strong, as
any judge can testify who has had to reverse the conviction of an unmistakably
guilty defendant in order to vindicate improved standards of criminal pro-
cedure.
It is that concern for the future and for the past that tends to prevent ad hoc
response to the facts, and puts a case where it belongs in the body of the
law.123
Illinois thus has cases on the status of dedicated land which have been
and are still the law in the state. The Garfield Park "case" would have
changed the law if the opinion had not been withdrawn, but the authors
can only comment with John Greenleaf Whittier in his poem, Maud
Muller:
For of all sad words of tongue and pen,
The saddest are these: "It might have been!"
12 2 Id. at 324, 93 N.E. at 919.
123 Address by Chief Justice Schaefer, December 28, 1959, in ASSOCIATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1959 PROCEEDINGS 19 (1960).
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-A NEW LOOK
A controversial body of law, namely the so-called Act of State Doc-
trine, has been subjected to a new examination in a recent New York case'
arising from Cuba's nationalization of American-controlled Cuban enter-
prises. This New York case has narrowed, if not greatly modified, several
past decisions of the Supreme Court2 which contributed to the formation
of the Act of State Doctrine. In order to fully understand the significance
of this case, it is essential to understand what the doctrine is and how it
arose.
1 Banco National De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). This case
is at present on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
2 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918);
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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The doctrine arose out of a large number of cases, both American3
and foreign,4 which dealt mainly with seizures of private property by a
sovereign. The American courts answered an issue common to many of
these cases by applying language used by the United States Supreme
Court in deciding a related case 5 some sixty-five years ago. This language
as applied has become known as the Act of State Doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The situation typically arises when a foreign country takes the private
property within the country of either an alien or a national, and then the
seizing country sells this property to a third party who is later sued in
another country by the former property owner. A hypothetical example
will illustrate: X owns property in a foreign country. A new government
takes control of that country and nationalizes X's property. Z, an Ameri-
can citizen, buys this property from the foreign government and brings
it back to the United States. X, the former owner, attaches the property
and institutes suit to regain it Z alleges by way of defense that X was
divested of title by the governmental acts of the foreign country, and that
the American courts cannot examine the validity of the acts of a foreign
sovereign without offending that country. X replies that the foreign act
which purported to divest him of title should not be recognized because
of its illegality or because it is repugnant to the public policy of the
forum state.
Two closely connected issues arose out of cases similar to the hypo-
thetical example. The first of these issues was whether or not the court
can examine the act of a foreign state to see if it was lawful. The second
issue arose only if the court decided that it could examine the validity
of the foreign act. That issue was whether or not there was any basis on
which the court could regard the foreign act as legally insufficient to
divest the original owner of title.
The American Courts Up To This Time
The answer of the United States courts to the first issue has precluded
the necessity of answering the second. The following words of the Court
in Underhill v. HernandezO have been consistently used to answer the
first issue:
3 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, supra note 2; Banco De
Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940); Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., supra note 2; Oetjen v. Centra Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
4 Re Helbert Wagg & Co., (1956) 2 Weekly L.R. 183, 1 All. E.R. 129; Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate, (1953) 1 Weekly L.R. 246; Luther v. Sager, (1921) 3 K.B. 532;
Wolff v. Oxholm, (1817) 6 N. & S. 92, 105 E.R. 1777.
5 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897),.
6 Ibid.
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Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 7
In terms of our hypothetical case, this means that once the defendant in
the action before the court has demonstrated that his title stems from the
action of a sovereign State taking effect on the property within that State,
the courts will accept this act as conclusive proof of title. In absence of
other factors then, the defendant would retain the property even though
it had been extorted from the owner by force and the defendant had
knowledge of this extortion.8
The language quoted above has become commonly known as the Act
of State Doctrine. No attempt will be made here to trace the doctrine
back to its basic principles, but it is generally recognized as an offspring
of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.9 By way of background, the
origin of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity might be examined. This
doctrine was originally based on a judicial assumption that a foreign
sovereign would not come into a foreign country, nor would the sov-
ereign send his agents or ships, unless he had an express or implied promise
of immunity from judicial control.10 In short, a foreign sovereign is im-
mune from suit in domestic courts only because of a court-granted privi-
lege." A foreign sovereign has no such right according to international
law.12 This origin has not always been remembered, because the courts
have gradually begun to regard the immunity as a right; in less than fifty
years after Underhill the courts refer to the immunity as a "traditional
restraint" on the jurisdiction of the court which can be removed by the
executive. 13
The facts of Underhill v. Hernandez14 were that Underhill, an Ameri-
7 Id. at 252.
8 This was the situation in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163
F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
9 House, The Law Gone Awry: Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
38 (1949).
10 Comment, 57 YALE LJ. 108 (1947).
11 Lipper, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234 (1960);
House, supra note 9.
12 Lipper, supra note 11; House, supra note 9. This topic is treated thoroughly in I
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATONAL LAw 267-74 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). Contra, United
States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Wulfsohn v. Russian
Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
13 This was the view of the court in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
14168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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can citizen living in Venezuela, was denied a passport and confined by a
general of the revolutionary army which later became the diplomatically
recognized government of Venezuela. Underhill sued the general in a
United States court to recover damages for his treatment. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the acts of the general were the acts of
Venezuela and as such were not properly the subject of adjudication in
the courts of this country. This was a proper statement of principles
already decided under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, namely, that
American courts will not render a judgment against a sovereign or his
agents without the sovereign's consent.' 5 The court further held that the
courts of this country would not sit in judgment of the governmental
acts of another country done within its own territory. This conclusion
was not necessary to the determination of the case and is therefore
dictum.
The next case which contributed materially to the formation of the
Act of State Doctrine was Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.16 In this case
the general of a Mexican revolutionary army seized certain hides belong-
ing to a Mexican citizen. The hides eventually came into the hands of
the defendant, an American citizen, and were replevied from him by the
plaintiff, also an American citizen. Plaintiff was the assignee of the orig-
inal Mexican owner. The revolutionary army became the recognized
government of Mexico prior to the final disposition of the case. The
Court held that the principle enunciated in the Underhill case (that the
conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully ques-
tioned in the courts of another government) was as applicable to a case
involving title to property brought within the custody of the court as it
was in cases in which claims for damages were based upon acts done in
a foreign country. The practical effect of the decision was to extend
the privilege of immunity to protect title derived from foreign acts as
well as the foreign acts themselves. There was no re-examination of the
basic issues involved by the Supreme Court in the Oetjen case. The Court
also held that the conduct of foreign relations of our government is com-
mitted by the Constitution to the executive department of our govern-
ment, and whosoever is the sovereign de jure17 or de facto'8 of a territory
is not a judicial but rather a political question. This language has often
been used as an argument for the application of the Act of State Doctrine,
15 Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
16 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
17 Recognition de jure gives a foreign regime the status of a legal government in its
relations with the recognizing State. Lipper, supra note 11.
18 Recognition de facto indicates that a State has seen fit to take official cognizance
of the fact that a regime exercising national sovereignty has an existence as a govern-
ment. Lipper, supra note 11.
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so it should be examined in its context. The Court was speaking only of
giving diplomatic recognition to a foreign government, something gen-
erally conceded to be a political function.19 The Court was not speaking
of interpreting effects of acts of that government once recognition had
been given, something seemingly a judicial function.20 International com-
ity and the danger of peril to the amicable relations between nations
which might result from a court's examination of foreign acts were the
two reasons advanced by the Court for the decision.
Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,21 a companion case of Oetjen, extended
the dictum enunciated in Underhill one step further. The facts were
substantially the same as the facts in Oetjen, except that in Ricaud the
property was originally taken from an American citizen. The Court held
that it had no jurisdiction to try and adjudge as to the validity of the
title acquired through the seizure and sale as against an American citizen
claiming prior ownership. The justification given by the Court was that
the issue involved was a political question not properly determinable by
the judiciary.
In these three cases, the privilege given a sovereign as a matter of
courtesy has been extended first to acts depriving a Mexican national of
his property, and then to title acquired by sovereign acts divesting an
American citizen of ownership.22 In light of the fact that foreign acts
divesting an alien of property without compensation are a violation of
international law, whereas foreign acts divesting a national of property
are not,23 this is an important extension to make without a thorough
examination of the basic factual differences between the three cases.24
Perhaps the most vivid example of the harsh results which can follow
when the courts uncompromisingly apply the Act of State Doctrine is
demonstrated by Bernstein v. Van Heygben Freres Societe Anonyme.25
In this case, a German Jew was forced by Nazi officials to sign over the
19 Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Kennett v.
Chambers, 55 U.S. 38 (1852); Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,
92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Calif. 1950); Kausner v. Levy, 83 F. Supp .599 (E.D. Va. 1949).
See also Comment, 58 MICH. L. REV. 100 (1959).
20 Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 451 (1956). Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
21246 U.S. 304 (1918).
22See House, supra note 9.
23 See Lipper, supra note 11.
2 4 
"[T]he maxim (Act of State Doctrine) could not be brought to bear upon an in-
ternational delinquency. This could be done only if either the maxim were itself a rule
of international law or if, being a rule of municipal law, it would at least serve rather
than pervert the true purpose of international law." Mann, International Delinquencies
Before Municipal Courts, 70 LAW Q. REV. 181, 197 (1954).
25 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
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title papers to a ship belonging to him to a German official designated by
the Nazi government. The ship was sunk, and Bernstein, now an American
citizen, brought a writ of attachment to recover the insurance proceeds
on the ship. It is significant to note that Bernstein, a United States citizen,
was asking a United States court to examine the validity of acts of a now
defeated government which was no longer recognized by the United
States. Yet the court dismissed Bernstein's claim on the grounds that the
courts are traditionally restrained from questioning acts of officials of a
foreign nation done within such nation's own boundaries, and the federal
government had not acted to relieve the courts of this traditional re-
straint. There are two things to note concerning this decision: first, that
the court speaks of a court-granted privilege less than sixty-five years old
as constituting a traditional restraint upon the court; and second, that the
court is granting immunity to acts which our country fought a war to
protest. The practical effects of this case are pointed out by the words of
District Judge Clark in his dissenting opinion:
[T]hey (our allies), as well as our enemies, may be mystified by what must
seem the vagaries of a policy looking to restitution to the Jews in Germany
at the same time that it accepts the acts of Nazi oppression of the Jews as
binding in American courts. 26
Judge Clark also pointed out that all previous cases had dealt with situa-
tions where the government had given de jure or de facto recognition to
the foreign State, while here the recognition had been withdrawn.
FOREIGN COURTS
I. England
The following cases illustrate the evolution of the English law on this
point:
The first significant case which dealt with the problem under considera-
tion was Wolff v. Oxholm.27 A debt due a British citizen from a Danish
national was extinguished by an ordinance of Denmark which sequestered
all property of English citizens within Denmark. The British citizen later
sued the Danish national in England, and the Danish law was pleaded as a
defense. The court held that this law of Denmark was not "conformable
to the usage of nations" 28 and was therefore void as a defense.
Luther v. Sager29 concerned the confiscation by Russia of certain wood
belonging to a Russian corporation. This wood was sold by Russia to the
defendant, an English firm, which brought it to England. The Russian
corporation brought suit in England to regain the wood. The court, in
dismissing the claim, held that England had recognized Russia, and there-
26 Id. at 254-55. 28 Id. at 106, 105 E.R. at 1182.
27 (1917) 6 M. & S.92, 105 E.R. at 1177. 29 (1921) 3 K.B. 532.
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fore the validity of the Russian decree and the sale to the defendant
could not be questioned by an English court. The court did not consider
the Wolff case in coming to the decision.
In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate,8 0 commonly called the Rose Mary
case, the court was concerned with Iranian nationalization. The Iranian
government had nationalized all the property of an English company in
Persia. Subsequently, the government sold some oil formerly belonging
to the English company to an Italian corporation. The English company
brought an action of detinue against a tanker of this oil in the Colony of
Aden. The Supreme Court of Aden held that the laws which purported
to nationalize the property of the English company were ineffectual to
divest them of title. The decision can be interpreted as formulating two
general principles. The first of these principles is that all legislation that
expropriates without compensation is contrary to international law. The
second is that such international law is incorporated into the domestic
law of Aden, and accordingly such foreign legislation will be recognized
as void in the Court of Aden. The court considered the Luther case but
decided that the principles enunciated in that case were valid only where
the property confiscated belonged to a national of the confiscating state.
In the Re Helbert Wagg & Co.3l case, a situation involving German
confiscation of debts due foreign creditors confronted the court. In deny-
ing the claimant relief, the court took the opportunity to criticize the
decision of the Rose Mary case by pointing out that the principles enunci-
ated in the Luther case did not distinguish between acts divesting a na-
tional of property and acts divesting an alien of title. The basis of the
decision was that the German Moratorium Act was not confiscatory and,
therefore, could not be denied effect. The court also said that there can be
confiscation of alien property which is not violative of international law
and which must be recognized by the English courts, but this was
dictum..3 2
The state of English law on the subject can be summarized in the fol-
lowing manner:
1. ,As a general rule, every civilized state must be recognized as having
power to legislate in respect of movables situated in that state, and such
legislation must be recognized by other states as valid and effectual to
alter title to such movables.88
80 (1953) 1 Weekly L.R. 246.
31 (195 6) 2 Weekly L.R. 183, 1 All. E.R. 129. Noted in 5 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 295, 301
(1956).
32 Accord, Note, 5 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 301 (1956).
83 Re Helbert Wagg & Co. (1956), 2 Weekly L.R. 183, 1 All. E.R. 129.
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2. There are three exceptions to the above general rule, namely: 4
a) English law will not recognize the validity of foreign legislation
intended to'discriminate against English nationals in time of war
which purports to confiscate wholly or in part movable property
situated in the foreign state.
b) English courts will not recognize the validity of foreign legislation
aimed at confiscating the property of particular individuals or
classes of individuals.
c) English courts will not enforce the fiscal laws or penal statutes of
another State.
3. The Wolff case illustrates one of the exceptions to the general rule,
namely (a). 35
4. The Luther case demonstrated the general rule and did not cite Wolff
because it recognized it as an exception to the general rule. 6  '
5. The Rose Mary case set up the general rule that confiscation of alien
property constituted per se a violation of international law which was
sufficient basis for a court to deny legal effect to such confiscation. 7
This in effect was an attempt to establish another exception to the
general rule considered above.
6. The Wagg case agreed with the general rule and exceptions, but dis-
agreed with the Rose Mary case insofar as it attempted to set up the
broad rule that English courts could not recognize any legislation
which confiscates alien property.38
HI. Germany
In an early German case, 39 the defendant in a criminal action pleaded
a confiscatory law of Czechoslovakia as a defense to a conversion charge.
The court found no evidence of such a Czechoslovakian law, but stated
that the law as alleged would be of no legal effect because no person can
be deprived of his property solely on the ground of his.nationality. In a
later case,40 the German courts had an opportunity to study the problem
more thoroughly. The facts of this latter case were that a Dutch company
84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 36 Ibid.
87 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate, (1953) 1 Weekly L.R. 246. Accord, note,
1954 CAMB. L.J. 20.
38 Accord, Note, 5 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 301 (1956).
89 Czechoslovak Confiscatory Decree Case, (American Zone) Court of Appeals of
Nuremberg, Germany; 1949 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law
Cases 25 (Lauterpacht-Case 14).
40N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatshapijen & N.V. Serembah-Maatchappij v. Deutsch-
Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. The history of this case from the trial
level to the final decision is analyzed by Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures
Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960).
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had concession rights in certain Indonesian tobacco plantations which
were nationalized by the Indonesian government. A harvest from these
plantations was sent to Germany, and suit was instituted in the German
courts to regain the tobacco. The Dutch company was denied relief on
the grounds that it had failed to prove property rights. The German
court in its discussion of the problem held that even if the Dutch com-
pany had property rights by virtue of their concession rights, they lost
them by the nationalization acts, and that the validity of these foreign
decrees could not be examined in light of domestic law. Also by way of
dictum, the court concluded that the nationalization decrees were not
contrary to international law, but that even if such acts were contrary to
international law, such illegality would be a basis for a claim to be ad-
vanced through the claimant's State Department, and would not be avail-
able to the court as a basis for holding the acts void.
.111. The Netherlands
In a similar case 41 which also arose out of the Indonesian nationaliza-
tion, the Dutch courts granted relief on the grounds that the Indonesian
acts were so discriminatory as to make them contrary to international
law. The court stated that it must deny any validity to the confiscatory
acts because of their repulsiveness to the conceptions of morality upheld
in The Netherlands.
IV. Italy
In a suit 42 arising out of Persian nationalization of oil belonging to the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Italian courts held that they had a duty,
not merely a right, to examine the validity of foreign acts. The conclu-
sion of the court was that they could refuse to apply foreign laws in
Italy which were contrary to international law, but that the nationaliza-
tion under consideration was not contrary to international law.
V. France
The French courts have refused to recognize title to property based
on a grant to Spanish authorities which had come into the possession of
the latter as a result of expropriation on the ground that French courts
may not recognize any divestment of a right of ownership without just
and previous indemnity except with the consent of the owner.48
41 Senembah Maatschappij N.V. v. Republiek Indonesie Bank Indonesia & De
Twentsche Bank N.V., Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1959, No. 73, 350. This case is
analyzed by Domke, supra note 40.
42 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Foro Italiano, 78 (1953), i, p. 719;
1955 International Law Reports 23 (Lauterpacht).
48 Societe Potasas Iberias v. Nathan Bock, Court of Cassation (Chambre Civile 1939),
1938-40 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 150 (Lauter-
COMMENTS
THE BANCO NACIONAL CASE
In February and July of 1960, Farr Whitlock and Company, a New
York partnership, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar from a Cuban cor-
poration, hereafter called "C.A.V.," the seller to deliver the sugar to ves-
sels designated by Farr Whitlock at a Cuban port.44 On the day that load-
ing of the sugar was to begin, Cuba passed a decree nationalizing the prop-
erty of certain named Cuban enterprises which were described as those
in which United States "physical and corporate persons" 45 held a ma-
jority interest. The nationalization decree purported to be a "defensive
measure" 46 against the "aggressive acts" 47 of the the United States, name-
ly, the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota. In order to obtain Cuban
consent to allow the now-loaded vessel to depart, Farr Whitlock entered
into a contract with a Cuban governmental corporation which purported
to sell the sugar to Farr Whitlock at substantially the same terms as
those contained in the original contract. The bills of lading covering
the shipment were delivered to Farr Whitlock in New York and then
negotiated to the customer in return for payment. Before Farr Whitlock
could pay the agent of the Cuban governmental agency, the New York
State Supreme Court directed, at the instance of C.A.V., that the money
be given to a receiver appointed by the court. The Cuban corporation
then brought action in the federal court against Farr Whitlock and the
receiver for recovery of the money.
In the court's own words, the crucial question was "whether this
court can examine the validity of the Cuban act under international law
and refuse recognition to the act if it is in violation of international law." 48
This in essence covers the same issues which have been considered so far.
The court's reasoning in determining an answer to this issue assumed
the following sequence:
a) The doctrine that courts of this country will not examine the validity
of an act of a foreign state insofar as it purports to take effect within
its own territory is a court-imposed restraint based on two factors:
1) Recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of each State within
its own territory.
2) A desire not to embarrass the executive in its conduct of foreign
relations.
pacht-Case 54); See also, Moulin v. Volatron, Commercial Tribunal of Marseilles
(1937), 1935-37 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 191
(Lauterpacht-Case 68).
44 Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
45 Id. at 376.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 380 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
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b) But here the Cuban government has lost its right to respect for their
sovereignty if they have violated international law. In addition, the
State Department has already. delivered a note to the Cuban govern-
ment declaring the very acts here questioned to be violative of inter-
national law, therefore there is no danger of embarrassing the
executive.
c) Therefore, if the court finds that the nationalization decree is violative
of international law, there is no reason why the court cannot deny
effect to this Cuban law, especially since international law is part of
our law.
The next issue considered by the court was whether the nationalization
decree violated international law. This issue was answered in the affirma-
tive for three reasons: the expropriation was not reasonably related to a
public purpose involving the use of such property; the nationalization de-
cree was discriminatory in that it classified American nationals separately;
and the nationalization decree did not provide adequate compensation for
the taking of property. The decision of the court was that it could deny
effect to the Cuban decree, and accordingly the court granted summary
judgment to Farr Whitlock and the receiver.
The importance of this case is best determined in the light of past
facts. The Act of State Doctrine began under circumstances involving
a claim for damages resulting from official acts of a sovereign's agent
within the sovereign's territory.49 The Doctrine, itself an extension of
the court-granted Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,5 0 has been extended
several' times without a thorough examination of the basic principles in-
volved. The previous cases5' which established and expanded the Act of
State Doctrine were sufficiently similar to the factual situation in Banco
Nacional to have been found controlling if the court wished to so find.
This is especially true when one notes that the Doctrine, good or bad,
constitutes a growing body of American law, while the reference cited
to justify the Banco Nacional decision are generally either foreign cases52
or law text references. If the Doctrine is found on appeal to be controlling
in this case, it will be the furthest extension of the Doctrine 'so far. The
facts of this case themselves present a strong argument against application
of the doctrine. Here there was a seizure from an American citizen in
49 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
50 Accord, Comment, 57 YAL L.J. 108 (1947).
51 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918).
52 Foreign courts are not faced with the Constitutional separation of powers peculiar
to the United States.
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time of peace. There was a seizure from an American citizen in the
Ricaud case also, but that seizure was in time of civil war, and a country
is always allowed more latitude in conducting international affairs during
wars. Here also there was a direct claim that the seizure was a violation
of international law,53 and in addition the State Department had officially
protested that the seizure was violative of international law. These facts
have never been combined in one case; their significance, especially the
protest by the State Department,54 will be more easily seen later. But
even if the courts find that the Doctrine should be applicable, this case
has at least forced a critical re-examination of the basic issues. A further
extension of the Doctrine without such an analysis would be a misapplica-
tion of the principles of stare decisis.
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST APPLICATION OF THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
General Principles
In general, States are legally equal as international persons.5 5 One of
the important consequences of this equality is that the courts of one
State do not, as a rule, question the validity or legality of the official
acts of another sovereign State or the official acts of its agents, at least
insofar as those acts purport to take effect within the latter State's own
jurisdiction.56 Some authorities would add a further qualification to this
rule, namely, that immunity of such official acts from court scrutiny is
granted only if the acts are not contrary to international law.57 Accord-
5a This is the first case where this exact claim'has been raised. "Such cases as Luther
v. Sagor . . . in England, and Underhill v. Hernandez, Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., are irrelevant to the issue, as in none of them was any
question of international law involved." (Author's footnotes omitted) Zander, The
Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826, 843 (1959).
54 This fact rebuts one of the arguments in favor of application of the Act of State
Doctrine, namely, allowing courts to examine the validity of foreign affairs would
embarrass the executive.
55 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (8th ed. 1955).
56 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947);
Luther v. Sager, (1921) 3 K.B. 532; Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55,
at 138, 267. This due respect for the acts of a foreign sovereign is generally limited to
acts of a recognized government. Seidl-Hohenvelden, Extraterritorial Effects of Con-
fiscation and Expropriations, 49 MICH. L. REv. 851 (1951). Contra, Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, supra; Banco De Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank,
114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940); Salimoff v. Standard Oil, 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
57 "Whatever may be the rule of International Law as to the duty of States (and
their courts to recognize the effects of foreign legislation ... there is no. such obligation
with respect to foreign legislation ... which is in itself contrary to International Law."
I Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 267-68.
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ing to the principle of territoriality, every State is granted an exclusive
right to determine the legal fate of all assets within its borders.58 A
corollary of this principle is that titles to property seized within the
country are generally recognized as good titles everywhere. 59 These
broad principles are limited however by the rule of international law
that a State is bound to respect the property of an alien,60 and violation
of this rule may justify the failure of other States to recognize titles
acquired by such violations of international law. 61 In determining whether
the property of an alien has been taken in violation of international law,
several factors must be considered.
The first factor is that the laws of most States permit wide interference
with private property in connection with taxation, measures of public
health or police, and the administration of public utilities. 2
The second factor is that fundamental changes in the political system
and economic structure of a State or far reaching social reforms entail
interference with private property on a large scale.63
The third factor is that seizure of private property for either of the
above reasons is not violative of international law if adequate compensa-
tion is given.64 The amount of compensation given for the property is
a very important factor in determining whether the taking constitutes
a violation of international law. Confiscation is the taking of private
property without adequate compensation,65 and the confiscation of an
alien's property is a violation of international law.66 In spite of the fact
that this principle of international law is generally recognized among
5sSeidI-Hohenvelden, supra note 56.
59Ibid.
60 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 352; Lipper, supra note 11; McNair, The
Seizures of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Inter-
national Recht 219 (1959); Comment, 58 MICH. L. REV. 100 (1959); Hecke, Confiscation,
Expropriation, and the Conflct of Laws, 4 INT'L L.Q. 345 (1951); Doman, Postwar Na-
tionalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COLUm. L. REV. 1125 (1948).
61 "Such legislation [which is violative of international law] may properly be treated
as a nullity and, with regard to rights of property, as incapable of transferring title to
the State concerned either within its territory or outside it." I Oppenheim, op. cit. supra
note 55, at 268. Also see McNair, supra note 60; Lipper, supra note 11.
62 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 352.
63 Ibid.
6 4 Doman, supra note 60.
65 Hecke, supra note 60.
66 The United States has consistently maintained that there could be no taking of the
property of American nationals unless compensation was given. 3 Hackworth, Digest
of International Law 652-89 (1942). See also McNair, supra note 60; Lipper, Acts of
State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234 (1960); Comment, 58 MICH. L.
REV. 100 (1959); Hecke, supra note 60.
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civilized countries, the problem further arises as to what constitutes
"adequate" compensation. There are two schools of thought on what is
"adequate." One school maintains that adequate compensation can only
mean full and prompt payment.67 This theory is based on an idea of a
minimum standard of international law which protects aliens, even if
nationals of the confiscating State are receiving inadequate compensa-
tion.68 This is generally accepted as the principle of international law
governing today.69 The other school of thought holds that adequate
compensation is only the amount given to the nationals of the confiscating
State under the same circumstances. 70 This theory has gained more
prominence since World War II, especially among those countries which
have nationalized 7' wholly or in part. It should be noted, though, that
there are no official documents or reports known to this writer in which
a country has expressly said that anything less than full compensation
constituted full payment to an injured alien.
That a State need not recognize foreign acts constituting a violation of
international law is generally accepted.72 The question then arises as to
whether the courts of one country should recognize such foreign acts
to be legally effective as a matter of comity. It would certainly seem that
a higher standard of international morality and a greater respect for
the sovereign acts of a foreign State would be promoted if the forum
courts would reject a foreign law which clearly conflicts with interna-
tional law. 73 In those States such as the United States where international
law is a part of domestic law,74 it would seem that the courts have a duty
to deny effect to foreign acts contrary to international law.75 The re-
fusal of American courts to consider foreign acts in the light of the law




71 Nationalization is a general, impersonal taking of the economic structure in full or
in part for the nation's benefit, with or without compensation. For a thorough treat-
ment of a country's rights to nationalize and its duties in regard thereto, see Doman,
supra note 60, and McNair, supra note 60.
72 Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1961); Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Foro Italiano, 78 (1953) i. p. 719, 1955 International
Law Reports 23 (Lauterpacht); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate, (1953) 1
Weekly L.R. 246; 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 267.
78 Zander, supra note 53.
74 United States-The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 71 (1820); 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 41-42. England-1
Oppenheim, supra. Belgium-1 Oppenheim, supra. France-i Oppenheim, supra. Swit-
zerland-1 Oppenheim, supra.
75 Zander, supra note 53; Lipper, supra note 66.
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of nations is -not merely a neutral doctrine of abstention. The effect of
such a doctrine is to lend the full protection of American courts, police
and governmental agencies to transactions which are contrary to the
minimum standard of civilized conduct. 76 This is even more evident
when one bears in mind that claims submitted through the State De-
partment are not always free from "policy consideration."
Specific Arguments
Various writers as well as the American courts have advanced many
reasons why the Act of State Doctrine should be applied. Other writers
have attempted to rebut these arguments favoring application of the
Doctrine. A brief summary of the fourteen main arguments on both
sides is as follows:
1. Argument Against.-The courts are not adequately equipped to
consider problems of international law. They cannot determine the
validity, within their own territory, of acts of a foreign nation taking
place half a world away. 77
Argument For.-The courts are certainly much better qualified to con-
sider international law in these cases than either the executive or legisla-
tive branches. Interpretation of the law is a function of the courts spe-
cifically granted by the Constitution.78 In addition, international law is
part of the law of the land,79 and our courts frequently consider inter-
national law in determination of other matters.80
2. Argument Against.-Examination of foreign acts and a denial by the
courts of their legal effects would seem to be a serious breach of inter-
national comity which might lead ultimately to war.
Argument For.-The confiscating State is itself guilty of a breach of
international comity if it violates international law. It should not be an
insult for one State to examine the acts of another State according to
the standards of international law.8 ' Such an examination violates no
generally accepted international right,82 and no international tribunal has
76 Comment, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 108 (1947).
77 This argument is raised in an article by Zander, supra note 53.
78 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, S§ 1, 2.
79 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 71 (1820); 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 41-42.
80 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); The Paquete Habana, supra note
79; Peters v. McKay, 195 Ore. 412, 238 P.2d 225 (1951).
811 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 267-68; Comment, 58 MIcH. L. REV., 100
(1959).
82 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 267; Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the For-
eign Act of State, 59 LAW Q. REV. 42, 155 (1943).
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ever adopted the rule of sacrosanctity of foreign acts.8 3 A court which
refuses recognition to acts which are violative of international law does
what is expected under principles of international law, 4 and it would
seem that the comity of nations would be better served by adherence to
international law rather than by the courts ignoring such violations . 5
American courts have assumed jurisdiction over actions in which a foreign
sovereign claimed immunity.86 No war resulted. The American courts
have examined foreign judgments to determine allegations that the judg-
ment was obtained by fraud, 7 or that the foreign court lacked jurisdic-
tion,8s or that the foreign judgment violated the public policy of the
United States.8 9 These judgments are also acts of state, yet there have
been no signs of international tension arising from such judicial examina-
tion.90 English,91 Italian,9 2 and French93 courts have examined the validity
of foreign acts, and yet international comity has not been materially dis-
rupted. If the foreign state feels that its rights have been interfered with,
it can protest through diplomatic channels.
3. Argument Against.-Opening foreign acts to judicial inquiry creates
uncertainty and non-uniformity in property transactions, thereby hinder-
ing world trade.9 4
Argument For.-Security in property transactions ultimately rests on
83 Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts, 70 LAW Q. REV. 181
(1954).
84 Ibid.
85 "[N]either principle nor practice countenance a rule which by reference to Inter-
national Law, obliges-or permits-courts to endow with legal effect ... acts of f or-
eign States which are in violation of International Law." 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra
note 55, at 270. See also Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts,
70 LAW Q. REV. 181 (1954).
8ONational Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Compania Espanola v.
Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
87 The W. Talbot Dodge, 15 F.2d 459 (S.D. N.Y. 1926).
88 Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812 (1869).
89 Pope v. Heckscher, 266 N.Y. 114, 194 N.E. 53 (1934).
90 Accord, Lipper, supra note 66; House, The Law Gone Awry: Bernstein v. Van
Heygben Freres, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 38 (1949).
91 Re Relbert Wagg & Co., (1956) 2 Weekly L.R. 183, (1956) 1 All. E. R. 129;
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate, (1953) 1 Weekly L.R. 246.
92 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. S.U.P.O.R., Foro Italiano, 78 (1953), i, p. 719, 1955
International Law Reports 23 (Lauterpacht).
93 Societe Potasas Iberias v. Nathan Block, Court of Cassation (Chambre Civile-
1939), 1938-40 Annual Digest & Reports of Public International Law Cases 150 (Lauter-
pacht-Case 54); Moulin v. Volatron, Commercial Tribunal of Marseilles (1937);
1935-37 Annual Digest & Reports of Public International Law Cases 191 (Lauterpacht-
Case 68.
94 This objection was raised in a Comment, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959).
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acceptance by all nations of a minimum standard of conduct. 05 By meas-
uring rights created by foreign States against international law, the
United States courts would lead the way in promoting an international
standard of conduct. The fact that such action may occasionally give
rise to uncertainty in property transactions seems comparatively unim-
portant, for such results arise only as part of an attack on a much greater
threat to security, namely, the uncertain standard of comity as the basis
for international trade.9 6 Such decisions might temporarily hinder trade,
but they might also very well halt confiscation of alien property.9 7 Bar-
ring the goods so seized from the world market would also remove the
aspect of profit as an incentive for such action.
4. Argument Against.-International law is interpreted differently in
different countries.
Argument For.-It is true that many areas of international law are open
to dispute, but there are also principles which are generally accepted by
civilized nations. 98 The claimant in any action would still have the burden
of proving that the foreign acts of seizure constituted a violation of in-
ternational law. It is not argued that the courts must deny effect to any
foreign seizure, but rather that the courts should be allowed to deny
effect to foreign acts which are in clear violation of international law.9
In the event of a failure to prove such a clear-cut violation, the courts
would merely deny the claimant relief as they have done in the past.
Interpretation of law is traditionally a function of the court.100 If the
courts cannot interpret international law according to a generally ac-
cepted understanding of the principles involved, then the State Depart-
ment certainly cannot be expected to do so in determining whether there
is a basis for a claim to be submitted through diplomatic channels.
5. Argument Against.-Opening foreign acts to judicial inquiry might
lead to unfavorable treatment of American property abroad.
Argument For.-In the context of a case such as Banco Nacional De
Cuba or Ricaud, this argument in effect states that the United States
courts should recognize foreign acts which confiscated property of an
American citizen for fear that a failure to so recognize would lead to
95 Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 108 (1947).
96 Ibid.
97 Comment, 58 MICH. L. REV. 100 (1959).
98 1Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1-35.
99 "By a consistent use of the principles of private international law, a proper defer-
ence to the clearly expressed policies of the Executive, and by an intelligent use of judi-
cial discretion, it should be possible to recognize and give effect to all such foreign
acts of state which do not conflict with the fundamental concepts of justice and
morality prevailing in the international community." Zander, supra note 53, at 852.
100 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, 2.
COMMENTS
other such acts. In cases where there is a violation of international law,
it is very possible that American property abroad has already been un-
favorably treated.
6. Argument Against.-Allowing the court this right of inquiry into
such acts is not an effective remedy to the problem because the part of
the property in litigation which can be returned to the injured party is
usually only a small part of the total property confiscated. Therefore it
would be wiser to require that the claimant submit his entire claim
through diplomatic channels.
Argument For.-This objection misses the entire point. The issue in-
volved is whether the courts can determine the rights of parties properly
before the court as to property within the jurisdiction of the court. The
issue is not whether the court can correct the total wrong. The function
of the court is to adjudicate rights, not to solve all the evils in the world,
and in these cases there are rights before the court to be adjudicated.
Nor does the fact that a claimant is granted a judgment for part of his
confiscated property bar him from instituting a claim through diplomatic
channels for the remaining property or compensation for that property.
7. Argument Against.-Judicial review of foreign acts might force
double payment. A buyer might have to pay the former owner as well as
the selling country.
Argument For.-An extension of this objection would bar the courts
from assuming jurisdiction in any case involving stolen property. Surely
those raising this objection would not argue that a person buying stolen
property should be allowed to retain that property as against the owner
on the basis of this double payment argument. A buyer of goods is in a
better position to protect himself than one whose property is arbitrarily
seized.
8. Argument Against.-Allowing the courts power to examine and
even disregard foreign acts would grant the courts control over part of
foreign relations previously an exclusive prerogative of the State Depart-
ment, namely, the duty of protecting the interest of the United States
and its citizens abroad. Allowing the courts such power is an arrogation
of the executive power.
Argument For.-The separation of powers contained in the Constitu-
tion is not an insulation of powers.10 1 There are principles of distribution,
but there are also overlappings and a significant interdependence. 10 2 The
courts cannot be barred from their Constitutional duty of determining
individual rights merely because they incidentally accomplish a result
101 Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104
U. PA. L. REV. 451 (1956).
102 Ibid.
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usually intrusted to the executive. In view of the interdependence among
the branches of our government, it would not seem to be an arrogation
of executive power to bring court decisions into harmony with national
policy.103 A good illustration of this point would be the Bernstein case.
Here it could scarcely be called an arrogation of executive power to
deny effect to acts which this country had protested by going to war.
Looking at the objection conversely, the refusal of the courts to grant
to claimant relief would throw the burden of determining whether he
has a valid claim on the State Department, a burden which the State
Department is ill equipped to bear. This burden of making determinations
in each individual case could readily lead to embarrassing situations if
foreign delegates should construe particular decisions as a personal diplo-
matic affront. 04 In effect, the executive would then be determining title
to property, a function of the judiciary. 05
9. Argument Against.-Even if the confiscation of private property is
violative of international law, this violation is the basis for a claim to be
submitted through the State Department and does not make such an act
void.
Argument For.-This objection begs the question in that the very issue
in dispute is whether the court can dispose of this claim by disregarding
the foreign acts, or whether the State Department must handle the claim.
This objection also fails to take into account that a violation of interna-
tional law may be both the basis for a diplomatic claim and a court's
excuse for denying the violative act any legal effect, and the two may
not be mutually exclusive.
10. Argument Against.-The review of a foreign governmental act is
tantamount to giving a judgment for damages against the foreign gov-
ernment.
Argument For.-This may in effect be true, but the immunity of a
sovereign is not an absolute right. There is no principle of international
law prohibiting such an examination. 10 6
11. Argument Against.-There is a dispute as to what standard of
compensation is adequate, and therefore there is no sure method of de-
termining whether there has been a violation of international law.
Argument For.-The principle of a minimum international standard of
equitable compensation is the prevailing rule of international law to-
day.10 7 The concept of prompt, full compensation has been challenged
103 Accord, Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 108 (1947).
104 Lipper, supra note 66.
105 Accord, Comment, 58 MicH. L. REv. 100 (1959); Lipper, supra note 66.
106 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 55, at 267.
107 Doman, supra note 60; Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1960).
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mainly in regard to nationalizations. Where there is no full nationaliza-
tion, the pragmatic considerations which have undermined the full and
prompt compensation rule do not apply. 0
12. Argument Against.-Review of such foreign acts is a "political
question" over which the courts cannot assume jurisdiction.
Argument For.-A political question is one which is commited to either
the legislature or executive for final determination.109 It has also been
explained as one that, according to the required or habitual distribution
of sovereignty, is properly determinable by the executive or legislative
branches of the government. 110 There is a distinction, however, between
a political question and a judicial question which is concerned only in-
cidentally with a political issue."' The granting of official recognition
to the new government of a foreign country has always been considered
a function of the executive, and therefore "recognition" is considered a
"political question. 11 2 Sovereign immunity is usually an incident of of-
ficial recognition 1 3 and is closely connected with it, yet it is granted
by the courts, and the courts have assumed jurisdiction in cases despite
a plea of such immunity.114 The courts have also held that the scope and
effect of the law of any foreign nation is a judicial question.115 It would
seem that the courts should be free to consider and pronounce an opinion
upon the exercise of sovereign power by a foreign government if the
consideration of those acts of a foreign government constitutes only a
preliminary to the decision of a question of private rights which in itself
is subject to the competency of the court.116
108 The entire question of the duty of compensation is treated in 109 U. PA. L. REV.
245 (1960).
109 Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV.
485 (1924).
110 Dickinson, The Law of Nations, 73 n. 36 (1st ed. 1929) quoting from Foster v.
Globe Venture Syndicate, 69 L. J. CH. 375.
111 Lipper, supra note 66.
112 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Lipper, supra note 66.
113 However, the immunity has been given even when there was no recognition
[Salimoff v. Standard Oil, 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933)] and when the foreign
government has ceased to exist [Banco De Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438 (2d Cir. 1940); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir. 1947)].
114 National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Compania Espanola v.
Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
11 Anderson v. N.S. Transandine Handemaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502
(1942).
116 Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 LAW Q. REV. 42, 155
(1943).
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13. Argument Against.-Such judicial review might embarass the
executive.
Argument For.-This objection would not be valid where the executive
had already condemned the acts sought to be judicially reviewed such
as in the Bernstein case (where the acts had been condemned by actions
of the executive) and the Banco Nacional case (where the acts had been
condemned by diplomatic protest). The courts cannot make policy, and
a judgment does not bind the nation to any position in foreign affairs." 7
It would therefore seem difficult to understand how a court judgment
could interfere with foreign relations enough to embarass the executive.
The executive branch, through the suggestion procedure, has adequate
means of so informing the court when it deems it in the best interest of
the United States that the court refuse to hear the case on the merits." 8
The executive might also conclude a treaty validating the title acquired
or granting the foreign country compensation if the occasion were im-
portant enough.119 Fear of embarrassment of the executive does not
seem to be a very attractive basis upon which to build a rule of law, and
use of this as any criteria would lead to great uncertainty in decisions.
14. Argument Against.-The United States has invoked the Act of
State Doctrine as an answer to protests by foreign countries that the
United States had seized alien property.
Argument For.-Admitting arguendo that there were seizures, the posi-
tion of the United States would seem to be logical in light of the facts.
Until now the United States has extended the protection of the Act
of State Doctrine to other foreign countries. It would be inconsistent for
a country to deny itself the same protection which it extends to other
countries.
CONCLUSION
The Act of State Doctrine developed as an answer to a specific factual
problem. Under the facts of the Underhill case, perhaps it was a just
solution to the problem presented. As all other principles of law though,
it cannot be extended rigidly to new factual situations without an ex-
amination of the basic issues presented. When the reasons for application
of that principle of law no longer result in a just solution, the doctrine
should no longer be applied. The following quotations will best sum up
the correct attitude which should be adopted in regard to the use of the
Act of State Doctrine as a rule of law.
117 Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Mann, Judi-
ciary and Executive In Foreign Affairs, 29 GROTIUS Soc. TRANS. 143 (1943).
118 Lipper, supra note 66.
119 Accord, Comment, 58 MicH. L. REv. 100 (1959).
